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COMMENT 
HOW CALIFORNIA CAN 
HARMONIZE A TENANT'S STATE 
RIGHTS AND A LANDLORD'S 
RIGHT TO GO OUT OF BUSINESS 
PURSUANT TO THE ELLIS ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
California landlords doing business in cities with strict 
rent control laws have found a way to get around such laws 
and capitalize on the tight housing market. 1 As of 1998 Cali-
fornia landlords have simply relied on the utility of the Ellis 
Act,2 which has been in the California law books since 1986 
and prohibits government agencies from interfering with a 
landlord's decision to evict tenants and withdraw rental units 
from the market.3 For example, in San Francisco, a city with 
strict rent control laws, 205 buildings were Ellised from July 
1998 to June 1999; a jump from 1995, when only 5 buildings 
were Ellised.4 
The recent tre~d of Ellis evictions raises several legal is-
sues about a landlord's right to go out of business pursuant to 
the Ellis Act. Judicial review of the Ellis Act focuses mainly 
on the intent of the Ellis Act and its effect on local ordi-
nances.5 Recently, the First Appellate District of the Califor-
1 See Edward Epstein, Better Protection Urged for Evicted S.F. Tenants, S.F. 
Chron. Dec. 7, 1999, at A16; Dan Levy, New Law Gives Disabled, Older Tenants a 
Break, S.F. Chron., Oct. 9, 1999, at A18. 
2 See Levy, supra note 1, at A18. 
a See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060 (West 2000). 
4 See Levy, supra note 1, at A18. 
6 See City of Santa Monica v. Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d 153 (1988); Javidzad v. 
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nia Court of Appeal balanced the relationship between the El-
lis Act and a state statutory law prohibiting retaliatory 
evictions.6 The First Appellate District held that a tenant may 
not assert the retaliatory eviction defense to an Ellis eviction 
if the landlord complied with the procedural requirements of 
the Act.7 . 
Although the First Appellate District of the California 
Court of Appeal stated that a tenant retains the right to sue 
a landlord under the retaliatory eviction statute, the practical 
ability for a tenant to sue for retaliation is slim.8 As such, the 
First Appellate District in essence upheld a landlord's right 
under the Ellis Act at the expense of a tenant's substantive 
right. 9 The approach places the retaliatory eviction statute, 
and other substantive tenants' rights, in jeopardy if California 
courts follow the First Appellate District of the California 
Court of Appeal. . 
To overcome the unbalanced a,pproach taken by the First 
Appellate District, persuasive California judicial authority ex-
ists for courts to harmonize the right given to a landlord 
under the Ellis Act and the rights given to tenants under 
state law without limiting the rights of either a landlord or a 
tenant. 10 Specifically, the procedural requirements for an Ellis 
eviction can be viewed as tenant-protections that supplement 
rights given to tenants by state law, rather than a limit on 
those rights. ll This approach is consistent with the express 
language of the Ellis Act, its legislative history and case law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. EVENTS LEADING TO THE ELLIS ACT 
The California state legislature enacted the Ellis Act in 
1986.12 The Act prohibits a public entity from interfering with 
6 See Drouet v. Sup. Ct., 2001 WL 102304 (Ct. App. 1 Diat. February 7, 2001). 
7 See id. 
S See Robert Selna, Tenants Lose Powerful Tool in Fighting Ellis Evictions, S.F. 
Daily Journal, Feb. 9, 2001, at 1. 
9 See id. at 3. 
10 See Rich v. Schwab, 63 Cal. App. 4th 803 (1998). 
11 See id. 
12 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060. 
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a landlord's decision to withdraw its rental accommodations 
from the market and go out of the rental business.13 The legis-
lature drafted and passed the Act in direct response to the 
California Supreme Court's decision in Nash v. City of Santa 
Monica. 14 
In Nash, a Santa Monica landlord challenged the consti-
tutionality of a Santa Monica ordinance that required a land-
lord who desired to remove rental units from the market, by 
demolition or conversion, to obtain a permit from the city's 
rent board. 15 Permits were authorized only if the landlord 
could show that: 1) the unit was not occupied by a person or 
family of very low, low, or moderate income, 2) the unit was 
not affordable to persons or families of very low, low, or mod-
erate income, 3) the removal would not adversely affect the 
housing supply in the city, and 4) the landlord could not 
make a fair return by renting the unit. 16 Nash, the landlord, 
claimed that the ordinance deprived him of his property with-
out due process of lawY 
The Superior Court of Los Angeles County agreed with 
N ash and determined the ordinance to be unconstitutional. 18 
Subsequently, the City of Santa Monica appealed the Superior 
Court's decision to the California Supreme Court.19 Whether a 
landlord has the right to go out of the rental business was an 
issue of first impression for the California Supreme Court.20 
The California Supreme Court analyzed the issue by ap-
plying a "rational relationship" test, which requires ordi-
nances and statutes to bear a substantial connection to public 
health, safety, morals, or public welfare.21 The California Su-
preme Court determined that the ordinance was in response 
to the housing crisis in the City of Santa Monica, therefore, 
13 See id. § 7060 (a). 
14 "It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to supersede any 
holding or portion of any holding in Nash . . . to the extent that the holding, or por-
tion of the holding, conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit landlords to go out of 
business." Id. § 7060.7. See Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97 (984). 
15 See Nash, 37 Cal. 3d at 100-0I. 
16 See id. at lOI. 
17 See id. at 102. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See Nash, 37 Cal. 3d at 102. 
21 See id. at 103. 
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bearing a substantial connection to the public welfare. 22 In ad-
dition, the ordinance placed an indirect minimal burden upon 
the landlord's liberty interest to demolish the unit.23 As such, 
the California Supreme Court held that a landlord did not 
have a constitutional right, free from government interfer-
ence, to go out of business.24 
Landlords in California did not view Nash favorably. 25 
Nash stood as an impediment for landlords who chose to with-
draw rental units from the market without obtaining prior 
government approval,26 Consequently, the California state leg-
islature addressed and resolved this concern through the en-
actment of the Ellis Act.27 
B. THE ELLIS ACT 
California Senator Jim Ellis (R-San Diego) brought the 
concern of landlords to the state legislature and introduced 
Senate Bill 505 (The Ellis Act) in 1985.28 The bill successfully 
passed through the Senate in 1986.29 Subsequently, George 
Dukmejian, then Governor of California, approved and signed 
the bill into law.30 
The express provisions of the Ellis Act prohibit a public 
entity from compelling a landlord to remain in the residential 
rental business when a landlord seeks to withdraw all such 
accommodations from the market pursuant to the Act.31 How-
22 See id. at 104. 
23 See id. 
:u See id. 
25 See California Ass'n of Realtors, Right to Cease Business As A Landlord of 
Residential Property: A Statement of Support by the California Association of Real-
tors, at 3, 'II 3 (1985). 
26 See id. 
27 "It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to supersede any 
holding or portion of any holding in Nash ... to the extent that the holding, or por-
tion of the holding, conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit landlords to go out of 
business." CAL. Gov'T CODE.§ 7060.7. 
28 See Letter from Jim Ellis, California Senator, 39th district, to George 
Deukmejian, Governor of California (Sept. 13, 1985) (on file with the California Sec-
retary of State) stating that he is the author of S.B. 505. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 "No public entity ... shall ... compel the owner of any residential real prop-
erty to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or 
4
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ever, local government is permitted to adopt notice require-
ments, consistent with the procedural guidelines of the Ellis 
Act, when a landlord seeks to withdraw its rental units from 
the rental market pursuant to the Act.32 Under the Ellis Act, 
landlords choosing to evict tenants are required to file their 
intent to withdraw rental accommodations from the market 
with local rent boards.33 Furthermore, the Act does permit 
land use regulation under certain circumstances.34 Specifi-
cally, the Act permits the government to enforce environmen-
tal standards, require approval for conversions of property 
from one type to another, and require permits for the demoli-
tion of a structure.35 
In addition, the legislature provided protections to te-
nants facing an Ellis eviction. Section 7060.1(d) of the Act 
states that the Act, in effect, does not supersede substantive 
tenant rights under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act, the Unfair Business Practices Act, 
and the Civil Code.36 The latter includes, among other things, 
the California statute prohibiting retaliatory evictions.37 Sec-
tion 7060.6 of the Act, the only section addressing tenant de-
fenses, permits tenants to raise procedural defects as an af-
lease." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060(a). 
32 See id. § 7060.4(a)(b) (West Supp. 2000). 
33 "Any public entity which .... has in effect any control or system of control on 
the price at which accommodations are offered for rent . . . may require . . . the 
owner notify the entity of an intention to withdraw those accommodations from rent." 
id. § 7060.4(a). 
34 See id. § 7060.7(a)(b). 
35 "[T]his act is not otherwise intended to do any of the following: (a) Interfere 
with ... government authority over land use, including regulation of the conversion 
of existing housing to condominiums or other subdivided interests or to other nonresi-
dential use following its withdrawal from rent or lease ... (b) Preempt local ... envi-
ronmental or land use regulations . . . that govern the demolition and redevelopment 
of residential property." [d. 
36 "Notwithstanding section 7060, nothing in this chapter does any of the follow-
ing: ... (d) Supersedes any provision of Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 7260), 
part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of Division 3 of Title 2 of this code, Chap-
ter 5 (commencing with Section 17200) of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and 
Professions Code, Part 2 (commencing with Section 43) of Division 1 of the Civil 
Code, Title 5 (commencing with Section 1925) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil 
Code, Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1159) of Title 3 of Part 3 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, or Division 24 (commencing with Section 33000) of the Health and 
Safety Code." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.1(d). 
37 See id. 
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firmative defense to an Ellis eviction.38 
C. AMENDMENTS TO THE ELLIS ACT 
Ellis evictions increased drastically during the latter half 
of the 1990s,39 decreasing the availability of residential hous-
ing in California.40 The California Senate approached the 
problem by amending the notice requirements provided by the 
Ells Act.41 Initially, the Act required landlords to serve te-
nants, being displaced pursuant to the Ellis Act, with a 60-
day eviction notice.42 As an attempt to slow down Ellis evic-
tions, the amendment increased the eviction notice date from 
60 to 120 days.43 If a tenant is elderly or disabled, the tenant, 
upon being served with an eviction notice has up to 60 days 
to extend the eviction notice from 120 days to one year from 
the time the eviction notice was ·served.44 
In addition to amending the notice requirements, the leg-
islature amended the Ellis Act to allow local governments 
with rent control ordinances to enforce such ordinances if, af-
ter two years from being withdrawn, the rental units were 
placed back on the rental market.45 Furthermore, if a landlord 
offers to rent the accommodations for residential purposes 
within ten years from the time the accommodations were orig-
inally withdrawn from the market, the landlord must give the 
displaced tenant the first right of refusal. 46 
38 "If an owner seeks to displace a tenant ... from accommodations withdrawn 
from rent or lease pursuant to this chapter by an unlawful detainer proceeding, the 
tenant or lessee may appear and answer or demur 
... and may assert by way of defense that the owner has not complied with the 
applicable provisions of this chapter, or statutes, ordinances, or regulations of public 
entities adopted to implement this chapter, as authorized by this chapter." [d. § 
7060.6. 
39 For example, in San Francisco 205 buildings were Ellised from July 1998 to 
June 1999 - a jump from 1995, when only 5 buildings were Ellised. See Levy, supra 
note 1, at A18. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 7060.4(a). 
43 See id. § 7060.4(b) (West Supp. 2000). 
44 See id. 
45 See id § 7060.2(a). 
46 See id. § 7060.2(a)(4). 
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III. DISCUSSION 
The California appellate courts have considered the effect 
of the Ellis Act on local ordinances and state laws.47 In City of 
Santa Monica v. Yarmark 48 and Javidzad v. City of Santa 
Monica,49 the Second Appellate District of the California 
Court of Appeal addressed whether local governments could 
limit or restrict Ellis evictions. 50 Mter examining the intent of 
the Ellis Act, the court declared that a landlord has an unfet-
tered right under the Ellis Act to go out of business without 
government interference.51 
Recently in Drouet v. Superior Court,52 the First Appellate 
District for the California Court of Appeal addressed whether 
state statutory rights given to tenants, rather than by local 
ordinances, limit the Ellis Act. In Drouet the court interpreted 
the relationship between the Ellis Act and the state statutory 
right prohibiting retaliatory evictions. 53 The court held that a 
tenant may not assert the retaliatory eviction defense in an 
Ellis Act unlawful detainer proceeding where the landlord 
complies with the procedural requirements of the Act.54 The 
court stated that a tenant asserting the retaliatory eviction 
defense interfered with the right of a landlord to go out of 
business under the Ellis Act.55 The court noted that a tenant 
could, however, bring a cause of action for retaliation after 
the tenant has vacated the rental unit.56 
A. CITY OF SANTA MONICA V YARMARK 
In Yarmark, Yarmark sought to withdraw his rental units 
from the market under the Ellis Act and served a 30 day no-
tice to his tenants, as required for month to month tenan-
47 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 153; Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 524; 
Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 1. 
48 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 153. 
49 See Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 524. 
50 See id. See also Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 153. 
51 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 162. See also Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 
524. 
52 See Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 1. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 13. 
55 See id. at 11. 
56 See id. at 13. 
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cies.57 However, Yarmark did not obtain any of the required 
permits or comply with any of the limitations for evictions re-
quired by the City of Santa Monica ordinance. 58 Consequently, 
the City of Santa Monica filed suit against Yarmark for de-
claratory and injunctive relief contending the evictions vio-
lated city ordinances. 59 Yarmark defended on the grounds that 
the city ordinances violated the Ellis Act.60 
The Second Appellate District of the California Court of 
Appeal agreed with Yarmark and invalidated the city ordi-
nances.61 The court determined that the Ellis Act has two es-
sential purposes: 1) to prevent public entities from interfering 
with a landlord who decides to withdraw units from the 
rental residential business and complies with the Act's terms 
and 2) to permit landlords the unfettered right to remove all 
residential rental units from the market, consistent with the 
guidelines set forth in the Act and adopted by local govern-
ments.62 Because the ordinance interfered with a landlord's 
right to withdraw his rental units in accordance with the Act, 
the California Court of Appeal invalidated the local 
ordinances.63 
B. JAVIDZAD V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA 
In Javidzad, the California Court of Appeal invalidated 
another provision of the same ordinance at issue in 
Yarmark. 64 There, Javidzad sought to withdraw the rental 
units from the market and demolish the building.65 However, 
a City of Santa Monica ordinance required Javidzad to obtain 
a permit from the local rent board upon a showing that he 
could not make a fair return by continuing to rent the prop-
erty, or that the property was uninhabitable and incapable of 
being habitable.66 Consequently, Javidzad challenged the ordi-
67 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 157-58. 
58 See id. at 158-59. 
69 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 153. 
62 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 164-66. 
63 See id. 
64 See Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 524. 
65 See id. at 528. 
66 See id. at 526-27. 
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nance as a violation of the Ellis Act.67 
The trial court ruled in favor of Javidzad, stating that the 
permit requirements did not allow landlords to simply go out 
of the rental business.68 As such, the trial court held that the 
ordinance compelled landlords to stay in the rental market in 
violation of the Ellis Act.69 Therefore, the trial court man-
dated the rent board to process the demolition permit without 
requiring Javidzad to obtain a removal permit from the 
board. 70 
The rent board appealed to the California Court of Appeal 
arguing that the Ellis Act permits local governments to regu-
late land use.71 In its opinion, the court stated that while the 
Ellis Act permits local governments to regulate the subse-
quent use of the property once the property has been properly 
removed under the Ellis Act, the city ordinance placed imper-
missible burdens on a landlord's right to go out of business 
and did not regulate the subsequent use of the property. 72 
Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision.73 
III. DROUET V. SUPERIOR COURT 
In Drouet v. Superior Court, the First Appellate District 
of the California Court of Appeal considered the relationship 
between the Ellis Act and a state statutory right given to te-
nants.74 In Drouet, Joel Drouet owned a two unit apartment 
building in San Francisco.75 In 1999, tenants complained to 
Drouet about a leaking shower wall, sewage drain, and a de-
teriorating back stairway, however, Drouet failed to make the 
repairs.76 Shortly thereafter, Drouet initiated the procedural 
steps required to make an Ellis eviction by filing with the lo-
cal rent board his intent to withdraw rental units off the mar-
ket, providing the tenants with an eviction notice, and filing 
67 See id. at 528. 
68 See id. 
69 See Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 528-29. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 529. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 531. 
7. See Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 1. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
9
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with the local rent board a second notice of intent.77 
After being served with the eviction notice, the tenants 
failed to evacuate the apartment unit. 78 Consequently, Drouet 
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer to evict the tenants.79 
The tenants answered the complaint and asserted four de-
fenses, including the retaliatory eviction defense.8o Drouet 
moved for summary judgment on each of the defenses.81 The 
trial court granted the motion in part but denied the motion 
as to retaliatory eviction.82 
Drouet then filed a writ of mandate with the Appellate 
Division of the Superior Court of San Francisco and sought to 
compel the trial court to grant the summary judgment mo-
tion.83 The Appellate Division granted Drouet's writ and held 
that a tenant cannot assert the retaliatory eviction defense if 
the landlord complied with the procedural requirements of the 
Ellis Act.84 The tenants filed a writ with the First Appellate 
District of the California Court of Appeal and appealed the 
decision.85 
The First Appellate District of the California Court of Ap-
peal agreed with the Appellate Division of the San Francisco 
Superior Court and held that a tenant may not assert the re-
taliatory eviction defense to an Ellis eviction.86 The court con-
cluded that a tenant may assert as a defense to an Ellis evic-
tion only that the landlord failed to comply with the 
procedural requirement of the Ellis Act.87 The court noted, 
however, that a tenant is not barred from filing a cause of ac-
tion against the tenant for retaliation.88 
The court approached the issue with the purpose of giving 
effect to the overriding legislative intent of the Ellis Act and 
77 See id. at 2. 
78 See id. 
79 See Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 2. 
80 See id. 
8! See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 2. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. at 13. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
10
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the retaliatory eviction statute.89 In doing so, the court deter-
mined that the legislature did not intend to restrict a land-
lord's right to go out of the rental market by permitting te-
nants to assert the defense of retaliatory eviction.90 According 
to the court, if a tenant is permitted to assert the defense, an 
unintended and massive barrier is created between the right 
of the landlord to go out of business and the ability to bring 
that right to fruition in accordance with the Ellis Act.91 
The court stated that the explicit provisions of the Act do 
not permit a tenant to assert the defense of retaliatory evic-
tion. 92 Section 7060.l(d) of the Act states that the right 
granted to a landlord does not "supersede" several substantive 
state rights, including the Civil Code.93 The court determined 
that the term "supersede," in reference to the Civil Code, did 
not mean that the retaliatory eviction defense - found in a 
single statute - remained applicable.94 The court reasoned 
that to hold otherwise would frustrate the intent of the Ellis 
Act.95 The court also explained that, because a landlord is not 
obligated to maintain a habitable premise once the landlord's 
building is Ellised, the landlord is not subject to an eviction 
defense.96 
The court explained further that a distinction exists be-
tween an Ellis Act unlawful detainer proceeding and one filed 
in the ordinary course of a landlord-tenant relationship.97 In a 
typical retaliatory eviction scenario, the landlord fails to fulfill 
the legal obligation to provide a habitable rental unit and 
files an unlawful detainer proceeding to evict the tenant.98 In 
that scenario,· the landlord intends to remain in the rental 
market and use the property to generate income.99 The deter-
rent effect of the retaliatory eviction statute remains in full 
89 See Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 10. 
90 See id. at II. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 9. 
93 See id. 
94 See Drouet, 2001 WI 102304 at 9. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 12. 
97 See id. at 11. 
98 See id. 
99 See Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 11. 
11
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force under such circumstances. loo According to the court, a 
. landlord is not, however, in the rental market when filing an 
Ellis Act unlawful detainer proceeding. lol The court stated 
that when the landlord complies with all procedural require-
ments of the Ellis Act and the tenant does not vacate after 
the 120 day grace period, then the tenancy ceases to exist. 102 
In addition, the court found the legislative history of the 
Ellis Act inconclusive on how to resolve the tension between 
the Ellis Act and the retaliatory eviction statute.103 In a foot-
note, the court emphasized portions of the legislative reports 
which stated that a landlord is "probably" prohibited from 
evicting tenants under the Act, if the eviction is a response to 
a tenant's request for repairs or housing code violations. l04 
The reports state that, under such circumstance the eviction 
"could" be deemed a prohibited retaliatory eviction. l05 The 
court qualified the terms "probably" and "could" as equivocal 
and found the use of such terms in the legislative history to 
be uncertain about the consequences of the statutory lan-
guage.106 The court concluded that the reasonable solution for 
resolving the tension between the Ellis Act and the retalia-
tory eviction statute is to permit tenants to sue landlords for 
damages, not to assert the retaliatory eviction defense. l07 
N. CRITIQUE 
The First Appellate District of the California Court of Ap-
peal in Drouet upheld the right of landlords under the Ellis 
Act while trumping the rights of tenants completely under the 
retaliatory eviction statute. !Os In Drouet, the court suggested a 
distorted image of the truth about what rights remain for te-
nants under the retaliatory eviction statute when faced with 
an Ellis eviction. Although the court notes that a tenant re-
tains the right to sue for damages for retaliatory eviction, the 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. at 13 n.9. 
104 See Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 13 n.9. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. at 12. 
108 See Selna, supra note 8, at 3. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss3/2
2001] TENANT'S RIGHTS 263 
right is practically nonexistent. lo9 The First Appellate District 
in Drouet imposed a harsh blow to tenants without a complete 
consideration of the Ellis Act. The text of the Ellis Act and its 
legislative history suggest that other California appellate 
courts, including the Supreme Court and other appellate dis-
tricts, should not follow the First Appellate District of the 
California Court of Appeal when balancing the rights granted 
to a tenant by state law and the right granted to a landlord 
by the Ellis Act. 
A. TEXT OF THE ELLIS ACT 
The Ellis Act was a direct response to Nash, where the 
local government placed complete discretion into the hands of 
its rent control board to decide when and how a landlord may 
withdraw its rental units from the market. llo It is this type of 
local control that the Ellis Act intends to prohibit. A close ex-
amination of the express language of the Ellis Act supports 
this view. 
Textually, the express language of the Ellis Act prohibits 
a "public entity" from compelling a landlord to remain in the 
rental market. 111 The California Government Code defines a 
"public entity" as government and not a private individual.112 
Thus, the express language of the Ellis Act does not prohibit 
individuals from asserting their substantive rights in an Ellis 
proceeding as a defense to an eviction. Even if the effect of as-
serting such rights is to compel landlords to remain in the 
rental market and force them to oblige by their duties as 
landlords, the Ellis Act offers no protection to the landlord 
when the eviction is in violation of tenants' rights. As section 
7060.l(d) states, the right granted to landlords does not su-
persede several substantive tenants' rights, including the re-
taliatory eviction statute. 113 Instead, the Ellis Act prohibits 
only a "public entity", i.e., government, from forcing a land-
109 See id. 
110 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.7. 
III See id. § 7060. 
112 " 'Public entity' includes the State, the Regents of the University of California, 
a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdi-
vision or public corporation in the State." 
1d. § 811.2. 
113 See id. § 7060.l(d). 
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lord to stay in the rental market, as in Nash. U4 
Both Yarmark and Javidzad support the interpretation 
that the Ellis Act bars only government from interfering with 
a landlord's decision to go out of business. In each case the fo-
cus is on government ordinances adopted to limit a landlord's 
right under the Ellis Act. 115 For example, in Javidzad and 
Yarmark, the Second District of the California Court of Ap-
peal held that an ordinance requiring landlords to obtain per-
mits prior to withdrawing rental units from the market forces 
a landlord to remain in the rental market and is therefore in 
violation of the Ellis Act.u6 
B. LEGISLATNE HISTORY 
From a historical stance, the legislative committee re-
ports on the Ellis Act are consistent with the understanding 
that the Ellis Act bars public entities, not individuals, from 
compelling a landlord to remain in business.ll7 For example, 
in a statement of support, the California Association of Real-
tors (CAR) stated that the Act prohibits government from 
compelling a landlord to remain in business. us CAR's concern 
was to limit the ability of local governments from interfering 
with a landlord's business decision to go out of the rental 
market. CAR explained that the government should not inter-
fere with a landlord's financial and psychological demands, 
which affect a landlord's willingness to stay in the rental mar-
ket.ll9 A landlord, not a government agency, is better situated 
114 "No public entity, as defined in Section 811.2, shall ... compel the owner of 
any residential real property ... to continue to offer ... accommodations in the prop-
erty for rent or lease." 
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060. 
115 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 153. See also Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 
524. 
116 See id. 
117 See California Ass'n of Realtors, supra, note 25, 'II 5 at 1. 
118 In its report CAR argued that the Ellis Act "[l]imits its application to actions 
of the state or any . .. political subdivisions . .. or regulation or administrative action 
implementing such statute . . . ." See id. 
119 "Requiring a person to continue to offer ... property for rent is a require-
ment that ... involves ... personal liability (including ... strict liability) ... and a 
continued devotion of personal services ... including psychological demands ... as 
evidenced by the pressures of tenant relations ... and contrary to sound public policy 
affecting involuntary servitudes." Id. at 3, 'II 2. 
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to handle those demands appropriately.120 
In addition, the Ellis Act clearly states that the right 
granted to landlords does not supersede any of the substan-
tive state rights afforded to tenants in the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act, Fair Employment and Housing Act, Community Redevel-
opment Law, Business Professions Code, and the Civil Code, 
including the retaliatory eviction defense. 121 The legislative 
committee reports on the Ellis Act clearly explain this provi-
sion of the Ellis Act.122 It states that "[t]his provision would 
limit a landlord's right to go out of business if the exercise of 
that right would jeopardize a tenant's rights under state 
law."123 As an example of the limitation placed on the Ellis 
Act, the legislative reports provide that if a tenant were 
evicted in retaliation for complaining to authorities of dilapi-
dations, the landlord would probably not be permitted to evict 
the tenant under the Ellis Act.124 
V. PROPOSAL 
If the legislature intends to leave the tenant defense 
against retaliatory evictions intact, and other substantive te-
nants' rights, the legislature should amend the Ellis Act and 
make its intention clear. Until the legislature amends the 
statute, the California courts should approach the issue with 
the intent of harmonizing both the procedural guidelines pro-
vided in the Ellis Act and the right given to tenants under 
the California Civil Code prohibition against retaliatory evic-
tions, and other substantive tenants' rights. This approach is 
120 CAR argued in its report that "[tlhe right to terminate a business involves a 
personal decision concerning the individual's ability to use his or her talents and re-
sources in a manner best suited to bring reasonable satisfaction to that individual in 
the application and utilization of that person's time and efforts, and a determination 
by them of their economic security." See id. at 3, 'f[ 3. 
121 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.l(d). 
122 Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 505 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) 
as amended May 15, 1985. 
123 See id. at 3. 
124 "This provision would limit a landlord's right to go out of business if the exer-
cise of that right would jeopardize a tenant's rights under state law. For example, 
this provision would probably prohibit a landlord from going out of business if the 
tenant had requested repairs or reported housing code violations. An eviction of the 
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preferable over upholding one statute and trumping another. 
The goal should be to permit the exercise of statutory rights 
afforded to both tenants and landlords, not to create a situa-
tion where it appears the legislature gives rights to its citi-
zenry with one hand but takes it away with the other. 
The California Court of Appeal in Rich v Schwab followed 
this approach in a similar context.125 In Rich, the California 
Court of Appeal addressed the availability of the California 
Civil Code prohibition against retaliatory evictions within the 
context of mobile home tenants and the Mobile home Resi-
dency Law (MHRL).126 In Rich, mobile home tenants faced an 
increase in rent after complaining to local authorities of a pre-
vious rent increase.127 Although the landlord followed the pro-
cedural steps for rent increases outlined in MHRL, the te-
nants refused to pay the increase and instead brought a class 
action suit against the landlord alleging a violation of the Cal-
ifornia Civil Code prohibition of retaliatory evictions.128 The 
landlord argued that the mobile home tenants could sue 
under the MHRL only for failure to comply with procedure 
outlined in MHRL.129 
The Fourth Appellate District of the California Court of 
Appeal disagreed with the landlord. 130 The court explained 
that where separate statutes relating to the same subject 
matter are in conflict the court is to construe them together 
and harmonize.131 The California Court of Appeal would not 
presume that the legislature enacted a statute with the intent 
of overruling long-established principles of law, unless the 
statute clearly declares such an overthrow.132 . 
125 See Rich, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 803. 
126 The MHRL grants owners of mobile homes occupied within mobile home 
parks greater notice protection for rent increases, changes in the terms of their ten-
ancy, and limits the circumstances under which they may be evicted. See id. at 813; 
See also CAL. Cry. CODE §§ 798.30, 798.55. 
127 See id. at 808-09. 
The retaliatory eviction statute also prohibits rent increases against a tenant for 
the purpose of retaliating against a tenant who asserts its rights as a tenant. See 
CAL. Cry. CODE § 1942.5. 
128 See Rich, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 808-09. 
129 See id. at 811-12. 
130 See id. at 814. 
131 See id. (quoting Palmer v. Agee, 87 Cal. App. 3d 377, 383 (1978». 
132 See id. 
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The California Court of Appeal determined that, although 
the MHRL provides a basis for a mobile home tenant to sue a 
landlord, it is not exclusive.133 The court also determined that 
the procedural protections afforded to mobile home tenants 
under the MHRL did not affect the rights afforded to mobile 
home tenants under the California Civil Code prohibition of 
retaliatory evictions.134 The court explained that the procedu-
ral protections in the MHRL were supplemental, and not a 
limitation, on the rights afforded to mobile home tenants 
under the California Civil Code's prohibition against retalia-
tory evictions.135 Therefore, the tenants still retained the full 
protections of the California Civil Code prohibition of retalia-
tory evictions.136 
The procedural protections under the MHRL at issue in 
Rich are similar to the procedural protections of the Ellis Act. 
Although the Ellis Act was created to protect landlords, not 
tenants, the landlord is subject to several limitations outlined 
by the Act itself 137 Included in those limitations are the pro-
cedural requirements for evicting a tenant under the Ellis 
Act. 138 The procedural guidelines of the Act are notice require-
ments given to tenants designed essentially for their own pro-
tection.139 As such, the procedural guidelines in the Ellis Act 
are the equivalent of the procedural protections found in the 
MHRL at issue in Rich.140 
Accordingly, Rich is persuasive authority for arguing that 
the procedural protections under the Ellis Act are supplemen-
tal to, rather than a limitation upon the defenses available to 
a tenant facing an Ellis eviction. Implicit in this proposal is 
the requirement that a landlord exercise its rights without 
trampling on the rights of others. Such an implication is not 
the equivalent of giving a landlord the right to go out of busi-
ness and then taking it away. The landlord would still have 
the right under the Ellis Act to go out of business, free from 
133 See Rich, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 814. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060. 
138 See id. § § 7060.4, 7060.6 
139 See id. § 7060.6. 
140 See Rich, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 813. 
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government interference. However, the landlord may not do so 
to retaliate for a tenant's actions or other proper assertion of 
rights afforded to a tenant by state law. This proposal merely 
places landlords within the realm of the law and not above it. 
In doing so, this proposal protects the right given to landlords 
under the Ellis Act and the right granted to tenants by state 
law, including the California Civil Code prohibition against 
retaliatory evictions, without compromising the rights of ei-
ther a landlord or a tenant. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the legislative intent of the Ellis Act and per-
suasive California judicial authority, the procedural guide-
lines of the Ellis Act are not the exclusive protections availa-
ble to a tenant during an Ellis proceeding. The procedural 
requirements of the Ellis Act can be considered tenant-
protections that are supplemental to rights granted to a ten-
ant by state law - the latter includes the California Civil 
Code prohibition against retaliatory evictions. This approach 
alleviates tension between the rights granted to tenants by 
state law and the right granted to landlords under the Ellis 
Act. 
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